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Purpose: The study aims to specify the form of the model used to determine the ability to 
obtain external financing (net debt) by real estate capital groups. The study also focuses on 
verifying the covenant function as a tool to limit the scale of projects implemented by real 
estate holdings. 
Approach/Methodology/Design: The analysis was carried out based on consolidated 
financial data of all (residential, commercial, and residential/commercial) real estate 
capital groups whose bonds are listed on the Catalyst bond in Poland. However, the said 
model is universal. The paper uses a method of examining documents, a method of analysis, 
and logical and qualitative construction to formulate new hypotheses, which can then be 
verified using a quantitative approach based on a larger sample. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient determined the relationship strength among covenants' pairs and between 
covenants and sensitivity ratio for the sample and the significance by the statistics t. 
Findings: The initiative to select covenants and determine their levels lies with issuers 
rather than investors. The inclusion of ND/EBITDA covenant in 75% of cases would mean 
an important reduction in credit exposure. The significant correlation among covenants 
identified in the study means duplication of information about the issuer's risk. 
Practical Implications: This study's conclusions can be used in the process of structuring 
the terms and conditions of corporate bond issues and provide important and new 
information primarily for bondholders in the context of leverage potential and the possibility 
of risk monitoring using covenants. The application contribution refers to the conclusions 
from the analysis of the monitoring potential of financial covenants and the influence of 
covenants on the change in the potential of capital groups due to the tightening of banks' 
credit policy at the level of special purpose vehicles. 
Originality/Value: The results of the analysis and theoretical considerations in this article 
complement existing research in the field of covenants' application by different stakeholders 
of bond issue programs.  
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Covenants are financial ratios (financial covenants) and management's promises, 
which serve as an instrument for allocating control rights between lenders and 
borrowers. The financial covenant's main role is to reveal the performance of the 
company as well as create a premise for private benefits of the debtor's owner if 
they are met (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Achleitner et al., 2009). Financial 
covenants serve as tools (Niedziółka, 2014; Niedziółka, 2015) for (i) monitoring 
key parameters describing the debtor's financial situation (debt level, profitability, 
debt service capacity, working capital management), (ii) adjusting the pricing of 
financing to the current level of risk, (iii) limiting the spectrum of actions that may 
lead to a change in the debtor's risk profile, (iv) controlling the degree of coverage 
of credit exposure by collateral, (v) activating or deactivating financing.   
 
This study aims to define the form of the model used to determine the ability to 
obtain financing by capital groups of real estate companies. The model is based on 
financial covenants typical for real estate activity introduced into contracts at 
holding structure levels. Based on the author's own covenant model of capital 
groups' credit displacement, with design and causal-descriptive features, maximum 
leverage levels of capital groups present on the public capital market were 
determined, the sensitivity of the scale of external financing to the tightening of 
banks' or bondholders' credit policy was determined. The research is also aimed at 
obtaining an answer to the question about covenants' function as tools to limit the 
scale of projects implemented by real estate companies.  
 
Once the sensitivity coefficient of the potential scale of the implemented projects to 
the tightening of credit policy by banks or bondholders was determined, the 
relationship between the value of the indicators on which the covenants were based 
and the value of the sensitivity coefficient was examined. Another issue examined 
in this study is the correlation relationship between indicators acting as financial 
covenants. It has been assumed that a significant correlation means de facto 
duplication of information about the issuer's credit risk. Hence the introduction of 
simultaneously highly correlated covenants means only an additional burden for the 
issuer, without affecting the control function's extension from the creditors' 
perspective.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Brycz et al. (2015) examined the types of covenants used for corporate bonds listed 
on Catalyst. The subject of this analysis was the degree of restriction of covenants 
in the context of conflicts of interest of shareholders and bondholders. At the same 
time, the aforementioned authors concluded that the terms and conditions of 
corporate bond issues in Poland relatively rarely contain limitations in the form of 
financial covenants, and the case of covenants' implementation, they mostly concern 
maximum debt level and, as it has been proved, neither the number of covenants nor 
the space for additional financing, which leaves covenants, are correlated with the 
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size of the issuer and its financial leverage. Ismail (2014) attempted to identify the 
factors determining the types and levels of financial covenants in contracts to which 
French listed companies were parties. The analysis covered the period from 2003 to 
2009. Ismail concluded that covenants are being introduced into agreements with 
profitable companies with good growth prospects, which applies mainly to 
syndicated loans. The author also checked whether the implementation of the 
covenants is affected by the characteristics of the debt while at the same time 
establishing that this dependence is significant. The study was carried out based on 
private debt, for which the funds came from bank loans.  
 
Reisel (2014) focuses on whether financial covenants can be an effective tool for 
agency problems. The author also raises an important problem related to the 
increase in debt resulting from agency problems. The study, carried out based on 
public bonds data, concludes that the restrictions on CAPEX and additional senior 
debt about current exposure reduced the cost of financing by approx. 35 to 75 bps. 
This means that investors see covenants as important tools for reducing agency 
problems. Simultaneously, relatively rarely covenants are applied to companies with 
a low probability of default and companies with strong growth trends. Królikowska 
and Sierpińska-Sawicz (2016) point out that the economic and financial situation of 
the issuer and the financial covenants significantly affect the success of the bond 
issue. In the case of bank loans, the covenants are more restrictive than those 
specified in the bond issue's terms and conditions. Conservatively defined covenant 
levels make it difficult to meet the issuance targets. The authors also note that the 
implementation of covenants and their types and levels depend on the industry's 
risk. Another issue remains the degree of precision of the covenants. In the case of 
the investigated companies (coal companies), the authors concluded that the highest 
degree of precision concerned the covenants describing the maximum level of debt, 
debt service capacity, and rules of disposal of assets.  
 
Demiroglu and James (2007) examined the factors determining the levels of 
financial covenants set out in the loan agreements and the information that the 
covenants' selection and assumed threshold values provide. The above-mentioned 
authors have shown that companies with higher risk and low investment potential 
are characterized by covenants established in a relatively more restrictive way. 
Furthermore, it was concluded that covenants' breaches have a significantly smaller 
impact on the CAPEX and the issuance of new debt in the case of tightly set 
covenants than when a relatively large headroom was used. Paglia and Mullineaux 
(2006) highlight financial covenants' role in reducing potential agency problems, 
information asymmetries, and their application when monitoring needs to be 
stepped up. Based on data from 1992-1994 and 28 different covenants, the above-
mentioned authors also noted that in the case of high-risk exposures, a wider range 
of covenants is used in addition to protection. The breadth of covenants (in terms of 
numbers and types of indicators) depends on the scale of the information problems 
and whether the exposure is collateralized. Collateralized exposures are treated as 
those with increased risk, but at the same time, the establishment of collateral is less 
restrictive as regards capital covenants. An interesting conclusion of this study is 
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that there is a negative correlation between the breadth of covenants and the scale of 
share in the exposure, which is left in the arranger's books. Also, the greater the 
number of lenders, the greater the breadth of covenants and their restrictions.  
 
Covenants are also used relatively less frequently about companies with strong 
growth trends and companies with a high transparency level. Bozanic et al. (2018), 
using the uncertainty measure, Loughran and McDonald's, to transform soft 
information into credit-risk relevant information, concluded that the level of 
contractual uncertainty is positively correlated with the amount of the original credit 
margin and the use of covenants, the level of which determines the funding price. 
Billet et al. (2007) explored the possibilities for companies' development depending 
on the level of leverage, debt maturity, and the level of financial covenants. This 
study shows that financial covenants may weaken the negative correlation between 
the level of leverage and development potential. The study carried out by Demerjian 
(2007) shows that for companies with strong cash flow, high profitability, and low-
income volatility, cash flow-based covenants are more frequent. On the other hand, 
about companies reporting losses, low profitability, and high variability of income, 
covenants referring to equity or net worth are relatively more common. In contracts 
with companies with a high level of working capital, the current ratio is quite 
common. The type and level of covenant used serve as information on credit risk.  
 
Bradley and Roberts (2015) concluded that the covenant structure is determined by 
macroeconomic factors and the characteristics of the debtor and the lender. 
Covenants are more frequent in small companies with significant growth potential 
or relation to entities with high leverage. Exposures arranged by investment banks 
and syndicated loans more often contain covenants than other types of loans. 
Covenants are used more often in times of recession than expansion and for debtors 
with high credit spreads. The study fills a gap in the literature on the use of financial 
covenants, addressing their impact on the scale of external financing and their use in 
the risk reduction process in the sense of a monitoring tool. 
 
3. Materials and Methods 
 
The analysis subjects were the annual audited financial statements and terms and 
conditions of issues of all real estate capital groups that bonds are listed on Catalyst. 
As of 15 June 2020, out of 24 capital groups, 21 published audited consolidated 
statements for 2019, while for 3 capital groups, the results for 2018 were based. Due 
to the seasonality of operations, the interim data for 2019 were not used. 
Consolidated results were analysed as financial covenants are constructed based on 
such data (Annex 1). The choice of consolidated data can be justified by the 
intention to indirectly control and monitor the entire capital group's debt, where the 
funds from the bond issue obtained by the holding company are allocated to equity 
or corporate loans to special purpose vehicles. The analysis of bond issue conditions 
allowed to identify the following most common types of financial covenants: Net 
Debt/EBITDA (ND/EBITDA), Net Debt/Equity (ND/E), Net Debt/Total Assets 
(ND/TA), Net Debt/(Net Debt + Equity): ND/(ND + E), Debt/Total Assets (D/TA), 
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Equity/Debt (E/D). On the other hand, covenants that only occur in single emission 
programs include Loan-To-Value (LTV), The Over-collateralisation ratio (total 
value of real estate/nominal value of bonds), Net Debt/Equity (ND/E) – standalone 
figures, Net Debt/Inventories, Not encumbered fixed assets/ Nominal value of 
bonds plus interest, Total Liabilities/Total Assets (Annex 2). Due to their rarity, 
lack of data (property value), or adaptation to the specific characteristics of 
exposure, the above-mentioned covenants have not been further analysed. The 
number of financial covenants in individual emission programs varied. However, in 
no case was it more than three. Their verification usually took place once every 
three months, as confirmed by the compliance certificates verified within this study. 
By selecting the covenants whose breach is identical to obtaining an index value at 
a level higher than that specified in the covenant, the following formula describing 
the maximum scale of financing of the group (net debt) can be determined: 
 
        (1) 
 
where: 
 – maximum net debt capacity 
 -Net Debt or Debt 
 – Equity or Total Assets or (Net Debt+ Equity) 
 – level of the covenant set in the terms and conditions of bond issuance 
programme, 
 – average level of Loan-To-Cost Ratio (for projects carried out in SPVs) 
 – change of  between t-1 and t 
 – change of  between t-1 and t (because of valuation of projects). 
 
       (2) 
 
The formulas presented above refer to a typical structure of financing based on a 
bond issue. According to it: 
   
• the holding company issues bonds which are not secured or are secured on 
assets (real estate) which are not encumbered in projects carried out by the 
special purpose vehicles,  
• the level of the group's indebtedness is controlled by means of a covenant 
defined based on consolidated data, 
• the funds obtained by the holding company through the issue of bonds supply 
the special purpose vehicles in the form of equity and/or subordinated loans,  
• at the level of the special purpose vehicles, covenants are defined (usually 
DSCR, LTV, LTC). In addition to the covenant operating under the terms of the 
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bond issue, the LTC level determines the scale of leverage of equity and the 
total value of project budgets. 
 
Based on the covenants existing in the terms and conditions of the issue, the 
maximum scale of credit exposure of each issuer, and the group's balance sheet's 
sensitivity to a tightening of the credit policy in the form of a 1pp reduction of the 
required LTC. The sensitivity index was determined according to the formula 
below: 
 
       (3) 
 
where: 
 – change of  because of diminishing of required LTC ratio by 
1pp. 
TA – total assets. 
 
Then, based on selected covenants (most frequently occurring in the terms and 
conditions of bond issuance programs), a change in the maximum scale of credit 
exposure was determined, assuming average values of indicators. The relationship 
between the values of the indicators that act as covenants in each bond issue 
program and the sensitivity coefficient was also analysed. Mutual correlations 
between the indicators that act as covenants were also examined. In both analyses, a 
two-dimensional distribution parameter in the form of Pearson correlation 
coefficient defined as below was used (Jóźwiak and Podgórski, 2012): 
 
       (4) 
 
r – correlation coefficient from the sample: 
n- number of observations, 
,  –the ratio acting as a covenant or SR for the capital group i, 
 - standard deviations of indicators acting as covenants or SR. 
 
At the same time, it was assumed that the surveyed capital groups constitute a 
random sample from a certain population of capital groups implementing 
development projects and financing themselves with bond issues. This is a 
conservative and restrictive approach, but it allows for more cautious and thus more 
credible conclusions. The above assumption results in the necessity to verify 
whether t statistics' value differs from zero. If it does not differ (is not larger), the 
hypothesis of no correlation between the variables should be taken. The statistic t 
can be written as (Jóźwiak and Podgórski, 2012): 
 
       (5) 
 Covenant Based Credit Capacity Model for Real Estate Capital Groups:  
Evidence from Poland 
416 
r –correlation coefficient from a sample with a t-Student distribution of n-2 degrees 
of freedom (Annex 3). 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
A survey of covenants occurring in the bond issue conditions of all real estate 
capital groups listed on Catalyst allows states that the most frequent of the 
monitored categories is net debt, which is then compared with equity or total assets. 
At the same time, such covenants are among those that are much easier for groups 
to meet than if the rather typical ND/EBITDA ratio for non-financial holdings were 
implemented. From this, it can be concluded that the initiative to select a covenant 
and determine its level lies with the issuer and not the bondholders. The inclusion of 
the ND/EBITDA covenant, which is quite typical for corporate finance in 75% of 
cases, would mean a significant reduction in credit exposure (taking as a threshold a 
rather moderate threshold f 2.0 - this is at the same time the average of the current 
ones) (Annex 4). 
 
Therefore, the ND/EBITDA is the least favorable covenant from the point of view 
of bond issuers. On the other hand, implementation at an average level of E/D 
covenant would increase leverage potential in 87.5% of cases. The a/m data are 
presented in Annex 4. It has been assumed that a significant correlation means 
duplication of information about the issuer's risk. Hence the introduction of highly 
correlated covenants simultaneously means only an additional burden for the issuer 
without affecting the expansion of the control function from the perspective of the 
bondholders. 
 
Among the most common financial covenants used in connection with the issue of 
corporate bonds, only in two cases, i.e.: (i) ND/EBITDA and ND/E, and (ii) 
ND/EBITDA and ND/(ND+E), a significant correlation between the indicators were 
identified (t statistics at (-) 2,514 for ND/EBITDA and ND/(ND+E) and 7,609 for 
ND/EBITDA and ND/E) for a materiality level of 0,05 respectively. This means 
that the use of only one of a given pair of covenants (or its inverse) brings similar 
monitoring benefits. 
 
Therefore, if the ND/EBITDA ratio is at a moderate level (analysis of the results 
shows that this is the case for the sample tested the 75th percentile of the ratio is 
3.34 and the 9th decile is 5.14 respectively), the introduction of ND/EBITDA 
covenant does not bring additional benefits. Nevertheless, its omission is connected 
with three types of risk factors: (i) the risk of manipulation of the amount of equity 
as a result of the revaluation of real estate and shares in special purpose vehicles, 
(ii) the risk of the issuer losing its bankability if a typical indicator describing 
creditworthiness exceeds the level considered acceptable by banks, (iii) the risk of 
omitting the issue of adjusting the exposure scale to the cash flow generated by the 
capital group, which may create unmonitored liquidity problems. 
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Finally, the demonstrated lack of correlation between the current value of the index 
based on which the covenant was defined, with the sensitivity coefficient, can be 
interpreted as the lack of influence of the covenants imposed on the bond issuers on 
the exposure scale understood as the sum of the budgets of projects implemented by 
a given capital group on the real estate market. Simultaneously, the analysis 
confirms that the number of covenants and the space for additional funding is not 
linked to the issuer's size and its leverage, as demonstrated by Brycz et al. (2015). 
For each of the surveyed capital groups, some form of debt ratio was used, which is 




This study's conclusions can be used in the process of structuring the terms and 
conditions of corporate bond issues and provide important and new information 
primarily for bondholders in the context of leverage potential and the possibility of 
risk monitoring using covenants. The covenant credit capacity model for real estate 
capital groups is a theoretical contribution. The application contribution refers to the 
conclusions from the analysis of the monitoring potential of financial covenants and 
the influence of covenants on the change in the potential of capital groups due to the 
tightening of banks' credit policy at the level of special purpose vehicles. In the 
applied approach, there are certain limitations, which include:   
   
• a relatively small number of real estate capital groups whose bonds are listed on 
the public market in Poland,  
• diversification of business models and funding models of real estate capital 
groups in Poland,  
• large variety of definitions of covenants used in the conditions of bond issues, 
• failure to consider changes in the value of indicators at different phases of the 
business cycle, which may be important in the context of the impact of COVID-
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List of surveyed real estate capital groups (in alphabetical order) 
1. Atal S.A. 
2. BBI Development SA 
3. Capital Park SA 
4. Develia SA 
5. Dom Development SA 
6. Echo Investment SA 
7. Geo, Mieszkanie i Dom sp. z o.o. 
8. Ghelamco Invest Sp. z o.o. 
9. Globe Trade Centre SA 
10. Griffin Real Estate Invest SA 
11. HB Reavis Finance PL 2 sp. z o.o 
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12. i2Development SA 
13. Inpro SA 
14. JHM Development SA 
15. JW Construction Holding SA 
16. Lokum Developer SA 
17. Marvipol Development SA 
18. MLP Group SA 
19. Polnord SA 
20. Polski Holding Nieruchomości SA 
21. Robyg SA 
22. Ronson Development SE 
23. Vantage Development SA 
24. Victoria Dom SA 
 
Annex 2: 
  ND/EBITDA ND/TA ND/E ND/(ND+E) D/TA E/D 
Sensitivity 
Ratio 
ND/EBITDA 1,000 0,274 0,851 -0,472 0,245 0,233 -0,297 
ND/TA 0,274 1,000 0,033 0,656 0,820 -0,550 -0,259 
ND/E 0,851 0,033 1,000 -0,703 0,097 0,307 -0,180 
ND/(ND+E) -0,472 0,656 -0,703 1,000 0,500 -0,679 -0,068 
D/TA 0,245 0,820 0,097 0,500 1,000 -0,742 -0,077 
E/D 0,233 -0,550 0,307 -0,679 -0,742 1,000 0,046 
Sensitivity Ratio -0,297 -0,259 -0,180 -0,068 -0,077 0,046 1,000 
 
Statistics t 
  ND/EBITDA ND/TA ND/E ND/(ND+E) D/TA E/D 
Sensitivity 
Ratio 
ND/EBITDA  1,339 7,609 -2,514 1,186 1,121 0,000 
ND/TA 1,339  0,010 0,688 0,883 -0,252 -1,259 
ND/E 7,609 0,010  -0,677 0,067 0,286 -0,857 
ND/(ND+E) -2,514 0,688 -0,677  -0,677 0,067 -0,322 
D/TA 1,186 0,883 0,067 -0,677  -0,420 -0,362 
E/D 1,121 -0,252 0,286 0,067 -0,420  0,217 
Sensitivity 
Ratio -1,461 -1,259 -0,857 -0,322 -0,362 0,217  
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Annex 4:  Credit capacity as a function of a covenant (CC – Credit Capacity; AD - 
Additional Debt; Delta – AD/CC) 
 I   II   III   IV   V   VI   VII   VIII   























-61% 1216 383 32% 
ND/TA 631 694 110% 154 17 11% 1084 544 50% 1791 -6 0% 3367 -722 -21% 148 -23 -15% 352 293 83% 1216 456 38% 








352 374 106% 1216 378 31% 
ND/(ND+E) 631 114 18% 154 -6 -4% 1084 
-
217 






-83% 352 393 112% 1216 517 43% 
D/TA 631 604 96% 154 0 0% 1084 468 43% 1791 10 1% 3367 -710 -21% 148 -32 -22% 352 208 59% 1216 267 22% 
E/D 631 715 113% 154 55 36% 1084 779 72% 1791 811 45% 3367 -508 -15% 148 
-
135 
-92% 352 780 222% 1216 1313 108% 
Minimum   -24%   
-
212% 
  -20%   -68%   -56%   
-
106% 
  -61%   22% 
 
 IX   X   XI   XII   XIII   XIV   XV   XVI   




-72% 1341 -753 -56% 1489 -293 -20% 369 -174 -47% 235 -44 -19% 814 -413 -51% 280 -192 -69% 855 -77 -9% 
ND/TA 








-44% 1341 -170 -13% 1489 -684 -46% 369 -6 -2% 235 -84 -36% 814 -318 -39% 280 23 8% 855 -182 -21% 
D/TA 
6446 -706 -11% 1341 -305 -23% 1489 66 4% 369 152 41% 235 -18 -8% 814 -330 -41% 280 262 93% 855 749 88% 
E/D 
6446 1291 20% 1341 184 14% 1489 982 66% 369 479 130% 235 8 3% 814 -254 -31% 280 368 131% 855 845 99% 

















 XVII   XVIII   XIX   XX   XXI   XXII   XXIII   XIV   
Covenant CC AD Delta CC AD Delta CC AD Delta CC AD Delta CC AD Delta CC AD Delta CC AD Delta CC AD Delta 
ND/EBITDA 






-61% 230 -25 -11% 564 -
446 
-79% 143 -132 -92% 483 -179 -37% 
ND/TA 
1370 712 52% 441 -62 -14% 728 190 26% 220 61 27% 230 120 52% 564 -
257 
-46% 143 14 10% 483 218 45% 
ND/E 
1370 913 67% 441 -73 -17% 728 0 0% 220 147 67% 230 98 43% 564 -
322 
-57% 143 76 53% 483 0 0% 
ND/(ND+E) 




-21% 220 74 34% 230 39 17% 564 -
259 
-46% 143 21 15% 483 18 4% 
D/TA 
1370 517 38% 441 -10 -2% 728 132 18% 220 21 10% 230 76 33% 564 -
310 
-55% 143 11 8% 483 267 55% 
E/D 
1370 2272 166% 441 237 54% 728 483 66% 220 348 158% 230 287 125% 564 -
194 
-35% 143 214 150% 483 425 88% 
Minimum   
-72% 
  
-39% 
  
-55% 
  
-61% 
  
-11% 
  
-79% 
  
-92% 
  
-37% 
 
 
